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THE LAW OF CONTEMPT IN LIGHT OF
SAHARA V. SEBI
JUSTICE M. JAGANNADHA RAO (RETD)'

Restrictions onfreedom of speech are warrantedin light of rights of accused
persons and that judges are subconsciously influenced by statements made
outside the court, especially in the media. Such restrictions, present in
Indian law, when contravened amounts to contempt of court. According
to the Explanation to section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, any
prejudicial statements made prior to filing the charge sheet will not be
treated contempt of court i.e. such statements are not 'imminent'. However,
the Supreme Court in AK. Gopalan v. Noordeen has held such statements
made subsequent to the arrest of a person, itself, will amount to contempt
of court. This is the common law position on the meaning of 'imminent' to
proceedingsfor the purpose of discerning whether it amounts to contempt
of court. It is the argument of the author that the Supreme Court in Sahara
India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. & Ors. v. SEBI has accepted the common law
position thereby extending the period covered by section 3. Thus, statements
made subsequent to the period in section 3 will amount to contempt under
the Act while those prior in time will be contempt under Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article deals with freedom of speech and with common law contempt
as decided in A.K Gopalan v. Noordeen, tHereinafter, "A.K. Gopalan"] which
has been followed in Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. & Ors. v. SEBP recently
and where specific reference has been made to contempt of court in relation to
criminal proceedings which are 'imminent'. Approval of that case and reference
to 'imminent' proceedings would mean that the Supreme Court considers that the
common law contempt continues from the date of arrest up to the date of filing
of the charge sheet etc. as stated in the Explanation to section 3 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 though that period is not covered by the said Explanation. In
other words, according to the Supreme Court in Sahara, prejudicial publications
from the date of arrest up to the period mentioned in the Explanation to section
3 would also be contempt according to the common law contempt principles as
laid down in A.K. Gopalan.

II. MEDIA FREEDOMS IN THE US AND INDIA:
APPRECIATING THE DIFFERENCE
Article 19(1)(a) deals with the freedom of speech and expression and Article
19(2) deals with the power vested in the State to make laws imposing reasonable
restriction on the said right for the purpose of the objects mentioned in Article 19(2).
It has been decided by the Supreme Court that, though there is no express provision
in the Constitution relating to the freedom of the press, the fundamental right of
the media in respect of the freedom of speech and expression is part of the right
contained in Article 19(1)(a). It has also been laid down by the Supreme Court in
several cases, starting with Express Newspapers v. Union of India3 that the freedom
of speech of the media is not unbridled but is subject to the same restrictions that
can be imposed by law on other persons or bodies.

I
2
3

A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen, 1969 (2)SCC 734.
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEIM, 2012 (8)SCALE 541.
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578.
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Of course, in the US, the First Amendment provides a right in absolute terms,
and there is no provision in the US Constitution for imposition of reasonable
restrictions. Even so, the US Supreme Court has evolved the principle of "real
and present danger". Justice Holmes stated in Schenck v. United States4 as follows:
I he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

Such a right of free speech which is almost in the nature of an absolute
freedom in the US does not exist in our country, Our Constitution clearly provides
in Article 19(2) that the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) can be
subjected to reasonable restrictions that may be imposed by law. The difference
between the American Law and Indian Law in regard to freedom of speech has
been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bab Lal Paratev. State ofMaharashtra,
Reliance PetrochemicalsLtd. v. Proprietorsqf lndian Express, and other cases.

III.

THREE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES RELATING TO

ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN INDIA
What are the basic principles of common law applicable to our criminal justice
system which are intended to protect a suspect or accused? There are three rights
of a suspect or accused which have been part of the common law in India, from
times long before the commencement of the Constitution. These common law rights
continue by virtue of the provisions of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution unless
they are inconsistent with or in derogation of the rights created in the Constitution.
That Article, in clause (a) defines law and in clause (b) it defines 'laws in force'.
These definitions being inclusive, the pre-existing common law principles with
regard to administration of criminal justice must be deemed to continue as long
as they are not inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights as
stated in Article 13.
Before referring to the said three principles, it will be necessary to state that
apart from the above said common law rights, there are constitutional guarantees
under Article 21 and Article 22. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived
4
5
6
7

Schenck v. United States, (1919) 249 US 47.
Id, at 52.
Babu Lal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884.
Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express, 1988 (4) SCC 592.
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of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to bail and the right to a fair trial are
also part of Article 21. So far as the right of a person for a 'fair and impartial trial'
is concerned, the Supreme Court has held that it is part of the right to life and
liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution (KAnbazhogan v. Superintendentof Police8
and Zahira Habibulla 1. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat9). Similarly, the Supreme Court
has held that the right to bail is also the part of the right to life and liberty under
Article 21 (Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing under trial Prisoners v.
Union of India,'0 and Akhtari Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh").Clause (1) of Article
22 provides that an accused should be informed, as soon as he is arrested, of the
grounds of such arrest and that the person shall not be denied the right to consult
or to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Clause (2) of Article 22
provides that any person arrested shall be produced before a magistrate within
24 hours of his arrest. These are constitutional rights.
Now, coming to the "common law rights" of the suspect or accused, they are
contained in three basic principles in our criminal justice system.

A. Principle(1)
The first principle is that a suspect or accused is presumed to be innocent
unless the contrary is proved. In the well-known case of Woolmington v. DPP, 2
Viscount Sankey stated that "... throughoutthe web of English criminal law, one golden
thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's
guilt".' In Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh,4 it was held that it is a "... cardinal
principleof riminaljurisprudenceas to the presumed innocence of an accused is otherwise
proved ... and that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner'sguilt" and
reliance was placed on the decision in Woolmington. In Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai
5
Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,"
the Court stated that "lilt is aftondamental principle of
criminalljurisprudencethat an accused is presumed to be innocentand thereforethe burden
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15

Anbazhogan v. Superintendent of Police, (2004) 3 SCC 707.
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee representing under trial Prisoners v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 731.
Akhtari Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2001) 4 SCC 355.
Woolmington v. DPP, 1935 AC 462.
Id,at 481.
Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 366.
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, 1964 SCR (7) 361.

The Law of Contempt in Light of Saharav. Sebi

lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonabledoubt" 26 As long
back as 1895, in Coffin v. United States, 17 the Supreme Court of the United States
traced the 'venerable history' of the presumption of innocence from Deuteronomy
through Roman Law to English Law and the common law of the United States.
B. Principle (2)
The second principle is that it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, as far as this principle is concerned,
it has been treated only as a procedural rule, and in some statutes reverse burden
of proof has been placed on the accused after the prosecution establishes some
prima facie facts.
C. Principle(3)
The third principle is quite important and is part of the procedure for a fair
trial under Article 21. The criminal court has to decide cases on the basis of material
produced by the prosecution and not on the basis of any external or indirect
pressure. This principle is one of the cornerstones in the administration of our
criminal justice system. In India, the suspect and accused have a basic right that
the judge, who is deciding his application for bail or about his guilt, decides the
same only on the basis of the evidence that is produced by the prosecution before
him and not on the basis of any other material.
In a famous statement, Wills J. observed in Rex v. Parke18 that "... it is possible
very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before it begins to flow. It is not
possible to do so when the stream has ceased""9 [Emphasis supplied]. The same judge
observed that the criminal court must decide upon the guilt of the accused only on
the basis of material produced before it and on no other material. While referring
to the statements of outsiders intended to or having a tendency to prejudice the
mind of the court, the learned judge said that such persons must be punished,"
...
because their tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive
the court of the power ... to administer justice duly, impartially
16
17
18
19
20

Id, at 364.
Coffin v. United States, (1895) 156 US 432.
Rex v. Parke, (1903) 2 KB 432.
Id, at 438.
Cf. Sanyal Committee, REPORT ON THE REFORM
1.2, Chap. VI (1963).
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and with reference solely to the facts judicially brought before it.
Their tendency is to reduce the courts .. to impotence, so far as the
effectual elimination of prejudice and pre-possessions is concerned.
[Emphasis supplied]
Frankfurter J. in Pennekamp v. Florida2 observed as follows:2
.Al[
Free Press may readily become a powerful instrument of
injustice. It should not and may not attempt to influence judges
or juries before they have made up their mind on pending
controversies. Such a restriction, which merely bars the operation
of extraneous influence specifically directed to a concrete case, in
no wise curtails the fullest discussion of public issues generally ...
The distinctive circumstances of a particular case determine whether
the law is fairly administered in that case, through a disinterested
judgment on the basis of what has been formally presented inside the
courtroom on explicit considerations, instead of being subjected to
extraneousfactors, psychologically calculated to disturb the exercise
of an impartial and equitable judgment. tEmphasis supplied]
Leading writers have also elaborated the third principle. In Wigmore on
Evidence,23 it was stated that the presumption of innocence and the duty of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of he accused are intimately connected with the
right to have a decision by the judge uninfluenced by anything other than the
material produced by the prosecution. The learned author states: 24
In a criminal case, the term (presumption of evidence) does convey
a special and perhaps useful hint over and above the other form of
the rule about the burden of proof, in that it cautions the jury to put
away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest,
the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion
solely from the legal evidence adduced. In other words, the rule
about the burden of proof requires the prosecution by evidence to
convince the jury of the accused's guilt; while the presumption of
innocence, too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and
additional caution (which is perhaps only as implied corollary to
the other) to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but
the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the
accused. This caution is indeed particularly needed in criminal cases.
[Emphasis supplied]

21
22

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US 331 (1946).
Id, at 365.

23

John Henry Wigmore, EVIDENCE (John T,McNaughton Rev ed., 1961).

24

Wigmore 407, cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S 478 (1978).
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According to the author, the court should not take into consideration the
fact that the police considered necessary to arrest the person or that the police
considered it necessary to charge the person. The case has to be decided only on
the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecution. That would therefore also
mean that no extraneous influence can be brought upon the court by anything said
in the media and that nothing should be done to adversely affect the freedom of
the witnesses to speak the truth. As pointed out in Taylor v. Kentucky 5 these three
principles run into each other and form a single principle in the administration of
the criminal justice system.
IV. MEDIA INFLUENCES ON JUDGES AND
THE THIRD PRINCIPLE
26
Frankfurter J. stated in Pennekamp v. Floridathat
However, judges are also human, and we know better than did
our forbears how powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how
treacherous the rational process .... And since judges however stalwart,
are human, the delicate task of administering justice ought not to be
made difficult by irresponsible print.... To deny that bludgeoning
or poisonous comments has power to influence, or at least to disturb,
the task of judging, is to play make-believe and to assume that men
in gowns are angels.... If men, including judges and journalists,
were angels, there would be no problems of contempt of court.
Angelic judges would be undisturbedby extraneous influences, and angelic
journalists would not seek to influence them. The power to punish for
contempt, as a means of safeguarding judges in deciding on behalf of
the community as impartially as is given to the lot of men to decide, is
not a privilege accorded to judges. The power to punish for contempt
of court is a safeguard not for judges as persons, but for the function
which they exercise. It is a condition of that function -- indispensable
for a free society -- that, in a particular controversy pending before
a court and awaiting judgment, human beings, however strong,
should not be torn from their moorings of impartiality by the undertow
of extraneous influence. In securingfreedom of speech, the Constitution
hardly meant to create the right to influence judges or juries That is no
more freedom of speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exercise of the right
to vote. [Emphasis supplied]

The observation that right to freedom of speech was not granted by the
Constitution to include a right to influence judges and juries is important.
25

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S 478(1978).

26

Pniekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S 331, 357 i1946).
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The above judgment in Pennekamp has been adverted to by the Supreme Court
in In Re: Arundhati Roy 27 and in Reliance PetrochemicalsLtd. v. Proprietorsof Indian
Express.28 In the latter case, the Supreme Court also referred to the judgment of
the House of Lords in Attorney General v. BBC,29 where in Lord Scarman observed
that 'administration of justice' should not at all be hampered with. The view of
Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal that professionally trained judges are not
easily influenced by publications was rejected. Lord Dilhorne stated as follows:-*
It is sometimes asserted that no Judge will be influenced in his
Judgment by anything said by the media and consequently that the
need to prevent the publication of matter prejudicial to the hearing
of a case only exists where the decision rests with laymen. This claim
to judicial superiority over human frailty is one that I find some
difficulty in accepting. Every holder of a Judicial Office does his
utmost not to let his mind be affected by what he has seen or heard
or read outside the Court and he will not knowingly let himself be
influenced in any way by the media, nor in my view will any layman
experienced in the discharge of Judicial duties. Nevertheless, it should,
I think, be recognized that a man may not be able to put that which
he has seen, heard or read entirely out of his mind and that he may
be subconsciously affected by it. It is the law, and it remains the law
until it is changed by Parliament, that the publications of matter
likely to prejudice the hearing of a case before a court of law will
constitute contempt of court punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both. tEmphasis supplied]
From the aforesaid judgments and literature, it is accepted that judges are
not superhuman and any publication prejudicing the trial may subconsciously
affect them in the decision making process. That is why the third principle is most
important one.

V. HUMAN

RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

From the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to below, it will be noticed
that out of the above three principles which are fundamental to the criminal justice
system, thefirst principle of presumption of innocence is treated as a human right.
The second principle of burden of proof is only treated as a procedural right. The
third principle,namely that the judge deciding the guilt of the suspect or the accused
27

In Re: Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343

28

Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express, 1988 (4) SCC 592.

29

Attorney General v, BBC, (1981) A.C 303 (HL).

30

Id, at 335.
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should base his decision only on the material produced by the prosecution and on
no other material, has been treated not only as a human right, but also as part of the
principle of fair trial which is included in the fundamental right under Article 21.
The following decisions and literature, deal with the three common law principles.
Thefirst principleof presumption of innocence is a part of the human rights
jurisprudence, present in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3
and Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
both of which India is a party. 32 in NarendraSingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh3 a two
judge bench of the Supreme Court observed that the presumption of innocence is
a human right. In Ranjithsing BrahmajeetsingSharma v. State of Maharashtra,4 Sinha
J. concurred with the observations made in the abovementioned decision3 5 The
same learned judge, again stated in a subsequent case, Krishna Janardhan Bhat v.
Dattaraya G. Hegde36 reasserted these conclusions and referred to Article 6(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights.? He observed that although India is not
bound by the same, the principle underlying the same (of balancing the rights of
8
the accused and society's interests) is at the heart of Indian criminal jurisprudence.
Finally, in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab,3 9 the same learned judge while dealing with
sections 35, 54 and 53-A of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act,

1985 observed that the presumption of innocence is a human right and is not a part of
Article 21:11 Thus the first principlerelating to presumption of innocence is treated as a
human right.

31

32

33
34
35
36
37

38
39
40

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 31d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 11 reads: "Ezeryone
charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guaranteesnecessaryfor his defence".
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21a Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
Article 14(2) reads: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty".
Narendra Singh v. State of MYP, (2004) 10 SCC 699.
Ranjithsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294.
Id, at 135
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattaraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force 3 September, 1953. Article 6(2) reads: "Everyone charged
with a criminaloffence shall be innocent until proven guilty according to law".
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattaraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54. 33.
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
Id, at 144.

Vol. 25(l)

National Law School of India Review

2013

The second principle that the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is treated only as a procedural right. In
fact there are several special statues in which a reverse burden has been placed as a
matter of procedure on the accused, once certain preliminary facts are established
by the prosecution. 'he second principleis therefore not treated as partof human rights.
The thirdprinciplethat the guilt of the accused should be decided by the court
only by the material produced by the prosecution and nothing else and that the
court should not be influenced in its decision making process by anything else
stated by any person or the media, is treated not only as a human right but also as
part of the right to fair trial which is part of the fundamental right under Article 21.
No trial in a criminal case can be said to be fair under Article 21, if the procedure
for conducting the trial permits the judge to take into consideration any extraneous
material, other than the actual evidence relied upon by the prosecution. In the
context of the third principle, it is necessary to point out that in Amarinder Singh
v. Parkash Singh Bada,41 it was held that the right to fair trial will be affected unless
the trial is uninfluenced by extraneous considerations (like political rivalry) and
that is imperative for the dispensation of justice. Thus, the third principleis not only
a human right but is also part of the fundamental right underArticle 21 for afair triaL

VI.

THE LAW ON CONTEMPT IN INDIA

A. The Position before the Constitution
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952
did not contain any definition of contempt. The High Courts and Supreme Court
applied the general common law principles relating to the law of contempt but the
quantum of punishment that the said Courts could impose was restricted by those
Acts. The power of contempt is contained in Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution
of India and the High Courts and the Supreme Court as 'Courts of Record' could
decide as to what is contempt according to the common law principles of contempt
both in respect of civil and criminal contempt.
It has been held by the Courts in India that the English common law of
contempt did not specifically state that prejudicial statements could be treated as
amounting to contempt of court, if such statements are made at the stage when
criminal proceedings are 'imminent'. In some cases, no doubt, the English courts

41

Arnarinder Singh v. Parkash Singh Badal, 2009 (6) SCC 260.
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impliedly 'leaned' towards such a view, but the courts did not expressly say so in

their judgments. On this aspect, hidian common law has deviated from English
common law. Indian courts have expressly held that prejudicial statements made at
the stage when criminal proceedings are 'imminent' could be treated as contempt.
This modification of the English common law by the Indian Courts has
been explained in detail by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v.
J Choudhury. 42 In that case, Biswas J. pointed out that the question whether there
may be contempt of court when proceedings are imminent was not definitely
ruled by the courts in England, referred to the English cases decided in 1903 and
1927 and then said that in India at least two full benches had pronounced upon
the question' 3 and referred to the Full Bench judgments of the Madras and Lahore
High Courts. In the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Tuijaram Rao v. Sir
James Taylor,14 Sir Lionel Leach C.J. stated that "to comment on a case which is about to
come before the court with knowledge of thefact is in our opinion just as much a contempt
as comment on a case actuallylaunched". After referring to the decision in Rex v. Parke
and Rex v. Daily Mirror, 5 it was pointed out that the question of imminence of the

criminal proceeding was not expressly mentioned in the English judgments. The
learned Chief Justice observed: 46
The question whether there can be contempt of court and proceedings
are imminent but not yet launched was discussed in Rex v Daily
Mirror;but as the question did not call for a decision, no decision was
given. Lord Hewart CJ however quoted the passage which was just
been cited from the judgment of Wills J and as there was no indication
of disapproval, it may, we think, be taken that the leaning was in the
same direction. [Emphasis supplied]
Again, in Re Subramanyam, Editor, Tribune and Ors,47 Harries C. clearly stated,
after referring to the observations of Sir Lionel Leach C.J. of the Madras High Court
that it was sufficient for the person to know that proceedings are imminent, and
that they need not actually be pending."'

42

Emperor v. J Choudhury, AIR (1947) Cal 414.

43

Id, at 1112-13.

44

Tuljaram Rao v. Sir James Taylor, AIR (1939) Mad 257,

45

Rex v. Daily Mirror, (1927) 1 KB 352.

46
47
48

Tuljaram Rao v. Sir James Taylor, AIR (1939) Mad 257, at 1 10.
In Re Subramanyam, Editor, Tribune and Ors., AIR (1943) Lah 329.
Id,at 335.
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Thus the common law of contempt in India deviated from the English law
before 1950. In most cases in India before 1950, it was held that criminal proceedings
can be treated as 'imminent' from the time of arrest of a suspect. However, in
some cases decided before 1950, there were observations that a criminal case may
be treated as 'imminent' even from the time when a First Information Report
[Hereinafter, "FIR"I was lodged with the police. The question whether there
would be a violation of the fundamental right of free speech if such a restriction
is imposed against publications made at the stage of FIR, did not arise before the
commencement of the Constitution.
B. The Positionafter the Constitutiontill the 1971 Act
In light of Article 13(1) and Explanation I to Article 372 the laws in force prior
to the commencement of the Constitution shall continue after commencement to
the extent they are not inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, the
common law of India as to whether publications in the media against a suspect
made, after the time when criminal proceedings become 'imminent', would amount
to contempt, continued to be in force after the commencement of the Constitution.
However, there was some conflict of opinion among the High Courts as to whether
a criminal proceeding could be said to be "imminent" from the date of filing of
the FIR. Whether this Report made criminal proceedings imminent came to be
decided in Surendra Mohanty v. State of Orissa decided on 23 September 1961,
which is unreported but has been adverted to in A.K. Gopalan. It was held that
criminal proceedings cannot be said to be imminent at the stage of the FIR, unless
the person was arrested.
The other decision in this regard is AK. Gopalan and requires a detailed
examination. In that case, one Mr Karunakaran died on 11 September 1967 at
Kuttoor during a bandh organised by the Communist Party in Kerala. On the
same day, a FIR was lodged. The next day, the said report was transferred to
another police station. On 20 September, Mr A.K. Gopalan made a statement that
Mr Karunakaran died on account of the pre-planned goondaism of Congressmen
at Kuttoor. He stated that a prominent Congress leader of Cannanore District
had given instructions for the murder on the previous day and that the police
had seized an unlicensed loaded gun and other weapons from the shop of a
Congressman at the scene of occurrence. He asked whether it should not be
inferred from all this that there was a pre-arranged plan to commit the murder.
Three days later, Mr K.P. Noordeen was arrested along with his two brothers. On
24 September the Magistrate remanded the accused to police custody. In the issue
of the newspaper daily Deshabhimaniof which Mr P. Govinda Pillai was editor and
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Mr M. Govindakutty was printer, the above statement of Mr A.K. Gopalan was
reproduced. On 29 September 1967 all the three accused were produced before the
Magistrate. On 1 November 1967 Mr Noordeen filed a contempt case in the Kerala
High Court against Mr A.K Gopalan and the editor and printer.
The Kerala High Court held that all three of them were guilty of contempt of
court. On appeal, two learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that the prejudicial
statements made by Mr. AK Gopalan were on 11 September while the arrest took
place on 23 September and the publication in the newspaper by the editor and
printer was on 25 September, which was subsequent to the date of arrest. On the
basis of this distinction, Mr. A.K Gopalan who made the statement before the date
of arrest was not guilty of contempt of Court while the editor and printer who
made the publication after the date of arrest were found guilty of contempt of
court, However, Mitter J. held that all three of them were guilty.
The statement of law in Surendra Mohanty that there will be no criminal
contempt if prejudicial statements were made at the stage of the FIR and when
a person was not arrested or when criminal proceedings were not "imminent"
was approved by the Supreme Court in AK. Gopalan. After referring to the right
of the media to bring public scandals to the notice of the public, as stated in R v.
Sayundranaraganand Walker, 9 the Supreme Court observed that Mr A.K. Gopalan
was not guilty of contempt as no arrest was made on the date of his statement.
But so far as the editor and printer are concerned the court observed that the
suspects were arrested on 23 September 1969 in a serious cognisable case. The
Supreme Court made it clear that the right to free speech including the right to
make prejudicial comments against the suspect cannot be advanced forward up
to the stage when the charge sheet is filed under section 173 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, [Hereinafter,"Cr.P.C."] 1898 (which is akin to section 173 of the Cr.P.C.,
1973 dealing with the date of the charge sheet).'
The Court thus held that if prejudicial statements by the media would be
contempt from the date when criminal proceedings become imminent or from the
date of arrest of the suspect. It was further held that if, that date of imminence is
moved forward up to the date of filing of the charge sheet under section 173 of
Cr.P.C. 1973, and if prejudicial statements against the suspect are allowed to be
made in the media, the right to a fair trial of the suspect under Article 21 would
be adversely affected. It was held in A.K. Gopalan that if prejudicial statements
49
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are made against the suspect after the date when criminal proceedings become
imminent or from the date of arrest, such statements would be contempt and
that such a law would not amount to any unreasonable restriction on the right of
freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court also laid down in A.K. Gopalan that the boundary is not
the date of FIR when prejudicial statements could be treated as contempt but the
boundary of free speech was the time when criminal proceedings are 'imminent'
or when the suspect is arrested. Indeed, if a law allows prejudicial statements to
be made by the media beyond the date when the proceedings become 'imminent'
or after the arrest of suspect, then the right to fair trial under Article 21 would
be affected because such a procedure cannot be treated as 'reasonable, fair and
just' within the principles of laid down by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India.5
This can be explained by an analogy. If a tree is cut, the effect of such an
action is both on the tree as well as on the ecology and the environment. Likewise,
prejudicial statements affect not only the persons against whom the allegations are
made affecting their right to have a fair trial under Article 21 but they also affect
the administration of criminal justice and must be treated as contempt of court
under the law made under Article 19(2), The court expressly stated that it is not
permissible to allow prejudicial statements to be made till the filing of the charge
sheet under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. 1973.
C. The 1971 Act
Under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, section 2(c) defines criminal
contempt and sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) refer to contempt which is committed by
way of interference with the administration of justice. That naturally includes
publications in the media which interfere or have a tendency to interfere with the
administration of criminal justice of which the principle of fair trial is one which is
protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. In the definition of criminal contempt in
section 2(c), the Parliament has more or less crystallised the common law concepts
of criminal contempt and has incorporated the same in that provision.
However, there is a change in the statutory protection granted to a suspect
against prejudicial statements made in the media, which could amount to
interference with the administration of criminal justice. The Explanation in section
51
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3 treated as contempt only those prejudicial statements which are made in the
media after the date of filing of charge sheet under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. 1973
or from the date when summons or warrants are issued or from the date the court
takes cognisance of the matter, The Explanation is however silent in regard to the
statements that may be made in the media at an earlier point of time, viz., when
criminal proceedings are 'imminent' or when the person is arrested.
In other words, under the common law principles of contempt, as laid down
by the Supreme Court in SurendraMohantyand A.K. Gopalan,prejudicial statements
would be contempt:
(i)

when the criminal proceedings are 'imminent' or from the date of arrest; and

(ii)

when a charge sheet have been filed against the suspect under section 173 of
the Cr.P.C. 1973 or where summons or warrants have been issued or where
the court has taken cognisance of the matter

The Explanation in section 3 covered only the period mentioned in clause
(ii) above and did not cover the period in clause (i) above, though both periods
are liable to be covered under the principles of common law of contempt as laid
down by the Supreme Court in Surendra Mohanty and AK Gopalan by balancing
the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21.
The protection given to the suspect or accused under the Explanation below
section 3, it will be seen, is for the latter period covered by clause (ii) above and is
perfectly necessary and justified. That has to continue and cannot be struck down
on the ground that the Explanation does not grant protection for the earlier period
covered by clause (i) above. Notwithstanding the fact that the Explanation does not
cover the protection granted by the common law contempt for statements falling
under clause (i) above as declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of Surendra
Mohanty and A.K. Gopalan, the said protection contained in the common law in
respect of statements falling under clause (i) continues, side by side along with
the protection granted to statements referred to in clause (ii) which are covered
by the Explanation to section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. That would mean
that the common law protection against prejudicial statements mentioned in clause
(i) above i.e. against the suspect, made in the media from the date when criminal
proceedings become 'imminent' or when the suspect is arrested, continues side by
side along with protection granted under the Explanation to section 3.
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D. The Validity of the Explanationto Section 3, Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971
As stated earlier, the Explanation to section 3 is valid to the extent of the
protection it grants and cannot be nor need be struck down on the ground that it
does not cover some other protection to the suspect available under the common
law of contempt as decided by the Supreme Court in SurendraMohanty and AK.
Gopalan, namely for statements made in the media falling under clause (i) above.
The Explanation is not liable to be struck down under Article 21. The protection it
gives to the accused from the various dates mentioned in the Explanation is part
of Article 21 and that cannot be struck down. Nor is it necessary to read it down.
If it is to be considered that the silence in Explanation to section 3 with regard
to the period before the dates mentioned in section 3 is to be treated as a deliberate
law made by Parliament to exclude protection to the statements made before those
dates, then, it follows that the omission is bad. But even so, the Explanation cannot
be struck down in as much as it protects the right to fair trial under Article 21
after the periods mentioned in the said Explanation. All that can be said is that the
omission of Parliament in not granting protection for the whole period, amounts to
a deprivation of the protection of Article 21 and such a declaration can be granted,
without striking down the Explanation.
Even assuming that Parliament added a proviso below the Explanation to
section 3 in the following terms, namely; "Provided that the publicationsmade after a
criminal proceedingbecomes imminent or after a suspect is arrested, but before the dates
mentioned in the Explanation,shall not be treatedas criminalcontempt", such a provision
will be hit by Article 21. It will be invalid because it offends the right to a fair trial
under Article 21 in favour of the suspect which exists as per A.K Gopalan, from
the date when criminal proceedings are imminent or when the suspect is arrested.
Such a provision will certainly be void as amounting to a 'deprivation' of the rights
of the suspect to life and liberty and to be protected against prejudicial statements
by the media for the excluded period since they will be unreasonable, unfair and
unjust according to Maneka Gandhi, read with the law declared in A.K. Gopalan.

VII. FIR, ARREST AND

IMMINENCE

A. FIR and Imminence in light of Section 438, Cr.P.C. 1973
The right to seek bail apprehending arrest, ("anticipatory bail") was
introduced by section 438 of Cr.P.C. 1973, where bail might be sought by a person
apprehending arrest in criminal proceedings. The question is whether when a
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person has filed an application under section 438 in the Court of Sessions or the
High Court seeking anticipatory bail, it could be said that criminal proceedings are
pending and whether the High Court could under Article 215, prohibit publications
in the media which may be prejudicial to the applicant, for a temporary period.
This question did not arise in 1969 in AK Gopalan in as much as the very
provision for anticipatory bail was introduced into the Code by legislation only in
1973. It may be noticed that for the purpose of making an application under section
438, it is not necessary that there should have been a FIR against the applicant, 52
In fact the Supreme Court stated in Gurubaksh Singh v. Punjab3 that in exceptional
cases, the court may limit the operation of the order to a short period until after
the filing of an FIR in respect of the matter and directing the applicant to obtain
bail order under sections 437 or 439 within a short period of the filing of the FIR.
There is no need to go into the question whether criminal proceedings are
'imminent' when an application under section 438 has been filed. When such an
application is filed under section 438, indeed a criminal proceeding is "pending"
in the criminal court. In SurendraMohanty and Gopalan,it was held that a criminal
proceeding cannot be said to be 'imminent' when a FIR has been filed with the
police. Once it is accepted that an application under section 438 Cr.P.C. can be
filed even before an FIR has been filed, then the statement of law made in Surendra
Mohanty and A.K. Gopalan requires modification.
Therefore all that is necessary is to clarify the principles laid down in Surendra
Mohanty and A.K. Gopalan in the following manner: A criminalproceeding cannot be
said to be 'imminent' merely because a FIR is filed, unless the person has been arrested,or
the person hasfiled an applicationunder section 438, before an FIR has been filed.
B. Why Arrest is Crucial for Contempt of Court
The reason why the date of arrest has been treated as starting point for
preventing prejudicial statements in the media was properly explained in Hail
v, Associated Newspapers Ltd." In that case, a person was arrested and thereafter
certain publications were made in a newspaper prejudicial to him. The said person
moved the High Court to punish the proprietors of the paper for contempt and to
also prohibit them from making further publications. The High Court agreed that
52
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the publication amounted to contempt and imposed a punishment of admonition.
In that connection, the High Court of Scotland observed that from the moment of
arrest, the person is brought 'in a relation with the court' and stated as follows:'
At the stage of arrest there is, just as at the stage of committal for
further examination, a person accused of crime who, if the subsequent
steps in the process are taken, may ultimately stand trial on the charge
on which he has been arrested or other charges. In order to discover
whether it would be legitimate to say that proceedings which bring
into existence arelationship between the court and a person charged
with crime have commenced at the moment of his arrest the question
which must be answered is whether a person arrested is within the
protection of the court. [Emphasis supplied]
The person arrested comes into a relationship with the court and under its
protection for the following reasons, according to the said judgment'
At that stage the person concerned is vested with rights which he can
invoke and which the court is under a duty to enforce. He must be
informed of the charge on which the arrest has been made and must
be brought before the court (a magistrate) not later than in course of
the first lawful day after he has been arrested lsection 321 (3) of the
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 19751. This is the modern definition
of the common law right of an arrested person to be carried "with all
convenient speed before a magistrate .. to be dealt with according

to law" (Hume, vol. ii, 80). Further a person arrested on any criminal
charge becomes immediately entitled to have intimation sent to a
solicitor that his assistance is required and informing him of the place
to which such person is to be taken for examination. This is provided
by section 19 (1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 and
section 19 (2) and (3) not orly provide further rights in that regard
but empower the sheriff or justice to delay examination on declaration
for a defined period to allow time for the attendance of the solicitor.

VIII.

RESTRICTIONS ON ARTICLE
ARTICLE

19(1)(a)

BEYOND

19(2)

It is contended for the media that the fundamental right of speech under
Article 19(1)(a) can be restricted only by a law made under Article 19(2) for the
purpose of punishing for contempt of court and therefore when there is no such
law made by the legislature under Article 19(2) for protection of the fair trial of the
suspect or accused under Article 21, prejudicial statements made after the date that
55
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criminal proceedings become imminent or when the person is arrested, cannot be
treated as contempt of court, for to do so would amount to restricting the freedom
of speech. This contention cannot be accepted for two reasons.
First, that a restriction on freedom of speech of a person can arise not only
out of a law made under Article 19(2) of the Constitution but also on account of
a constitutional provision like Article 21. This aspect is no longer res integra as is
clear from the recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok SabhaY It was argued in that case that the
fundamental right of the Member of Parliament under Article 19(1)(g) can be
restricted only by a law made by the legislature under Article 19(6) and cannot
be affected by the provisions of Article 105(3) of the Constitution which deal with
privileges of Parliament. Holding that a restriction flowing from a constitutional
provision need not be re-enacted by an ordinary law under Article 19(6), and
rejecting the said contention, the Supreme Court observed as follows 5 8
We are of the view that where there is a specific constitutionalprovision as
may have the effect ofcurtailing thesefundamental rights, iffound applicable,
there is no needfor a law to be passed in terms ofArticle 19(6). For example,
Article 102 relates to disqualifications provides that Members who are
of unsound mind or who are un-discharged insolvents as declared by
competent courts, are disqualified. These grounds are not mentioned
in the Representation of People Act, 1951. Though these provisions
would have the effect of curtailingthe rights under Article 19(1)(g), we
doubt that it can ever be contended that a specific law made in public
interest is required. Similarly, if Article 105(3) provides for the power
of expulsion (though not so expressly mentioned), it cannot be said that
aspecific law in public interest is required. Simply because Parliament is
given the power to make law on this subject is no reason to say that
a law has to be mandatorily passed, when the Constitution itself
provides that all the necessary powers of the House of Commons
vest until such a law is made. Thus, we find that Article 19(1)(g)
cannot prevent the reading of power of expulsion under Article
105(3). [Emphasis supplied]
The above reasoning can be directly applied to the present situation, It is not
necessary that Parliament should make a separate law under Article 19(2) protecting
the right to fair trial of a suspect or accused, for the purpose of restricting the right
under Article 19(1)(a). The constitutional protection in Article 21 which protects the
rights of the person for a fair trial is, in law, a valid restriction operating on the right

57 Raja Ram Pal v. fion'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, 2007 SCC (3)184.
58 Id,at 1166.
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to free speech under Article 19(1)(a), by virtue of force of its being a constitutional
provision. No law need be made on the same lines under Article 19(2).
Second, that when there are two Articles of the Constitution providing
different rights to different persons, in the event of a clash between these rights,
the well-known principle of harmonious construction has to be applied. This has
been done in several cases while restricting the scope of Article 19(1)(a) on the
basis of other provisions in the Constitution itself. In M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna
Sinha,5 and in the U.P.Assembly case (Special Reference No.1 of 1964) also known
as Keshav Singh's case,60 it was stated that the right of freedom of speech under
Article 19(1)(a) stands restricted by Articles 105(3) or 194(3) of the Constitution
relating to privileges of Parliament and State Legislatures, by the application of
the principle of harmonious construction.
For the two reasons mentioned above, the contention that there is no law made
under Article 19(2) to protect the suspect or accused from prejudicial statements
for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial and that the provisions Article 21 cannot
restrict the rights of free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is rejected.

IX.

THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORY BEHIND THE
EXPLANATION TO SECTION

3

On 1 April 1960, a private member of Parliament moved a Bill in respect
of the law of contempt to replace the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Thereafter,
the Ministry of Law and Justice set up a committee on 29 July 1961, with Mr H.S.
Sanyal, then Additional Solicitor General of India (later Solicitor General) for the
said purpose [Hereinafter, "Sanyal Committee"]. The Committee gave its Report
to the Government on 28 February 1963. In Chapter V, paragraphs 3.1 to 3.4,
the Committee dealt with the definition of 'contempt'. In another Chapter the
Committee dealt with contempt in relation to pending proceedings. In Chapter VI,
the Committee considered contempt in relation to 'imminent proceedings'. After
referring to the importance of the freedom of the press and the requirements of
an independent judiciary, the Committee observed: "A judiciary cannotfunction
properly ifwhat the press does is calculated to disturb the judicialjudgment in its duty
and capacity to act solely on the basis of what is put before it".6
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The Committee stated that in all contempt proceedings what is sought to be
ensured is that there is no unjustified interference with the court in the performance
of its duties, and that parties to proceedings are not subject to any extraneous
influence.12 The publication of reports regarding the investigation before the
completion of the same in the eyes of the Committee was bound to cause such
interference, thus making it of the opinion that it was unwise to "completely do
away with the rule relating to contempt in its application to imminent proceedings".0
The Committee then stated in that the mere filing of a FIR although the
logical point to draw a line at, did not serve as conclusive proof of proceedings
being imminent. 61The Committee went ahead to recognise the need for a different
approach to criminal matters, i.e. where an arrest was yet to be made a presumption
in favour of the alleged contemnor ought to be drawn that proceedings were not
imminent.' The Committed annexed a Draft Bill to their Report which in section
3(1)(a) stated as follows:
Section 3(1): A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the
ground that he has published any matter calculated to interfere with
the course of justice in connection with (a)
any criminal proceeding pending or imminent at the time of
publication, if at that time he has no reasonable grounds for
believing that the proceeding was pending or, as the case may
be, imminent,
(b)
any civil proceeding ................................ [Em phasis
supplied]
Thus, the Sanyal Committee in its Report of 1963 took into consideration
that there could be contempt of court if prejudicial statements are made when
criminal proceedings are imminent. In the body of the Report, they however stated,
as mentioned earlier, that statements made at the stage of FIR will not be contempt
though statements made after arrest will be contempt. The above approach of the
Sanyal Committee is consistent with what the Supreme Court decided six years
later in A.K. Gopalan. But the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is based on the Report
of the Joint Committee of Parliament [Hereinafter, "Bhargava Committee"] (23
February 1970) which did not notice the Judgment in A.K. Gopalan.
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The Bhargava Committee was appointed in December 1968. It conducted 26
sittings and the last sitting was 5 October 1969, and submitted a six page report
(omitting the dissenting part). It has been already noticed that on 15 September
1969 the judgment in A.K. Gopalan was rendered. It appears, however, that the
Joint Committee which held its last meeting on 5 October 1969 did not notice the
judgment of the Supreme Court dated 15 September 1969 which was delivered just
20 days before its last meeting. It therefore committed serious mistakes in its Report
by permitting prejudicial statements in the media up to the date of the charge sheet
under section 173 Cr.P.C. 1973 or from the date of issuing summons or warrant or
from the date the court takes cognisance of the matter and deprived the benefit of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan to the suspect from the date
when criminal proceedings become imminent or from the date of arrest.
For making these radical changes and departing from the recommendations
of the Sanyal Committee, it gave two reasons namely, one that free speech will stand
unduly restricted if allowed from the date of arrest or when criminal proceedings
become imminent and; two, that the word 'imminent' was vague, 66 The Committee
appended a Draft Bill of 1968, to their Report dated 23 February 1970 which
contained an Explanation below section 3 as follows:
Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, a judicial proceeding
is said to be pending (A) in the case of a civil proceeding when it is instituted by the filing
of a plaint or otherwise,
(B) in the case of a criminal proceeding under the Cr.P.C., 1898 or
any other law -

a.

b.

where it relates to the commission of an offence, when the
charge-sheet or challan is filed, or when the court issues
summons or warrant, as the case maybe, against accused,
and
In any other case, when the court takes cognizance of the
matter to which the proceeding relates

So far as the first reason given by the Committee, namely that the word
'imminent' proposed by the Sanyal Committee was 'vague' is concerned, it may be
noticed that the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan, while pointing out that criminal
proceedings do not become imminent from the date of the FIR lodged with the
Police, they do become imminent from the date of arrest of the suspect. The Supreme
Court went a step further and stated expressly that the date when the criminal
proceedings become "imminent" cannot be advanced forward to the date of filing
66
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of the charge sheet under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the Supreme Court had
clearly explained the meaning of the word 'imminent' and it cannot therefore be
called vague. The Bhargava Committee was therefore incorrect in observing the
word 'imminent' was vague.
So far as the second reason given by the Committee that treating prejudicial
statements, if any, made by the media after the date of arrest and before the date
of filing the charge-sheet would be an unreasonable restriction on the freedom
of speech under Article 19(1)(a) is concerned, the Supreme Court had clearly
decided in A. Gopalan that it would not be so and that on the other hand, if the
rights of the suspect were not protected against prejudicial statements from the
date when criminal proceedings become imminent or from the date of arrest, it
would interfere with the right of the suspect for a fair trial, that is under Article
21. Therefore, even on the second aspect, the views of the Joint Committee are in
the teeth of the principle of reasonableness evolved by the Supreme Court, while
balancing Article 19(!)(a) and Article 21.
The Parliament was therefore wrong in not accepting the Sanyal Committee
report and in adopting clause (B), sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Explanation to section
3, as recommended by the Bhargava Committee, omitting the protection to the
suspect for the period from the date when criminal proceedings become imminent
or from the date of arrest, up to the date of filing of the charge sheet under section
173 of the Cr.P.C.
X. COMMON LAW CONTEMPT IN THE CONSTITUTION
If the power of contempt for the period between the date when criminal
proceedings become 'imminent' or from the date of arrest up to the date of the
points of time mentioned in the Explanation is omitted and not covered by the
Explanation to section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the question arises
whether such statements will still amount to contempt even after 1971.
The words 'contempt of court' in Article 129 and Article 215 of the
Constitution are not defined but cover various classes of contempt which are part
of the common law of contempt as understood before the commencement of the
Constitution. For that matter, the ambit of the words 'contempt' in Articles 129 and
215 relating to contempt power of the Supreme Court and the Iligh Court, which
is constitutional, has been held to be wider than the power of criminal contempt
relating to interference in the administration of justice contained in section 2(c)
of the 1971 Act.
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The said Articles 129 and 215 state that the Supreme Court and the High
Courts are Courtsof Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. The said power has been accepted as the
inherent power of these Courts. The origin of the inherent powers of such courts to
punish for contempt has been discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev
Singh v. Hon'ble C.J., S. Teja Singh,' and several other cases including Delhi Judicial
Service Association v. State of Gujarat, and in Supreme CourtBar Association v. Union
of India.69 In Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla,70 the Supreme Court observed, in the
context of power under Article 129 and section 2 (c) of the Act of 1971, as follows:'
Law of contempt is only one of the many ways in which the due process
of law is prevented from being perverted, hindered or thwarted to
further the cause of justice. Due course of justice means not only
any particular proceeding but a broad stream of administration of
justice. Therefore, the words "due course of justice" used in Section
2(c) or section 13 of the Act are of wide import and are not limited
to any particular judicial proceeding. It is much wider when the
Supreme Court exercises suo motu power under Article 129 of the
Constitution. Due process of law in blinkered by acts or conduct of
the parties to the litigation or witnesses which generate tendency to
impede or undermine the free flow of the unsullied stream of justice
...
to thwart fair adjudication of dispute and its resultant end. If the act
complained of substantially interferes with or tends to interfere with
the broad stream of administration of justice it would be punishable
under the Act. ]Emphasis supplied]
Thus, as a matter of common law concept of contempt of court, the Supreme
Court held in A.K. Gopalan (1969) long before the commencement of the 1971 Act,
that prejudicial statements against the suspect, if made after the FIR will not be
contempt but if they are made at a stage when criminal proceedings are 'imminent'
or after the arrest of the suspect, then such statements would be contempt of
court. That is the meaning contempt of court under common law as declared by
the Supreme Court in 1969 and balancing the right of free speech under Article
19(1(a) and the right to a fair trial under Article 21. The Supreme Court and the
High Courts are therefore entitled under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution to
commit a person for contempt if he made prejudicial statements once the criminal
proceedings became imminent or when the person was arrested. That declaration
67
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made by the Supreme Court in 1969 retroactively declares the common law of
contempt as on the date of commencement of the Constitution in 1950.
In fact, when we come to the 1971 Act, we find that the common law concepts
of contempt of court were more or less incorporated in the definition of contempt
in section 2. Sub clause (c) therein refers to classes of contempt namely "publication
of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever", which
(ii)
(iii)

Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
of any judicial proceeding; or
Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner.

That indeed rightly summarises the common law principles of criminal
contempt as obtained before 1971.
The Supreme Court has held in Ram Autar Shukla that the meaning of the
words 'contempt of court' in Articles 129 and 215 is wider than the above definition
of criminal contempt in section 2(c). Therefore, before the commencement of 1971
Act, such statements similar to what is mentioned in section 2(c), were contempt
and could be punished under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, if such
statements were made at any time after the criminal proceedings became imminent
or the suspect was arrested, in view of AK. Gopalan.
Therefore, the law declared in AK. Gopalan, being the pre-existing law before
the 1971 Act, covered the entire period from the date when criminal proceedings
became imminent or when the person was arrested and that declaration of law by
the Supreme Court continues to be effective from 1969 onwards when A.K. Gopalan
was decided. The law that statements made within the period mentioned in AK.
Gopalan, define the scope of 'contempt of court' as defined in the Constitution under
Articles 129 and 215 and that continues in spite of the limited protection granted in
the Explanation to section 3 of the 1971 Act. The ambit and width of these words
cannot be restricted or abrogated by any law made by Parliament. The power of
contempt of the Supreme Court and High Courts which are saved under Articles
129 and 215 of the Constitution cannot be abridged by any ordinary law made
by Parliament. In fact here, there is only an omission in the Explanation, to cover
the earlier period and there is no positive provision taking away the contempt
power of the said courts, as explained in A.K. Gopalanfrom the date when criminal
proceedings become imminent or from the date of arrest.
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In other words, the 1971 Act does not expressly say that prejudicial statements
made at the time where criminal proceedings are imminent or when the person
is arrested will not amount to criminal contempt. The Explanation to section 3
is only silent with regard to that period. If there was such an express provision,
which took away any part of the content of common law 'contempt of court' in
force at the commencement of the Constitution, as explained in A.K. Gopalan, such
a law would be ultra vires of Article 21 and also of Article 129 and Article 215 of
the Constitution.
In Supreme Court Bar Association, the Supreme Court referred to the inherent
power of the superior courts of record to punish for contempt both inside and
72
outside the court and in connection with proceedings before the inferior courts,
and considered contempt to include any act adversely affecting the administration
of justice.' There is, therefore no doubt that publications made outside a court of
record would be contempt and punished under the inherent power of these superior
courts of record under Articles 129 and 215. The very purpose of the Constitution
saving the inherent powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts was to see that
that power was not taken away by ordinary law of the land. Law declared by the
Supreme Court in AK Gopalan cannot therefore be taken away by any law like
the Contempt of Courts Act 1971.

XI. CONCLUSION
Therefore prejudicial statements made after the periods referred to in the
Explanation to section 3 will continue to be contempt under the law made by
Parliament in 1971 while prejudicial statements made after the time when criminal
proceedings become imminent or person is arrested, stand covered by the words
"contempt of court" used in Article 129 and Article 215 of the Constitution, that
being the common law contempt before 1971 as explained by the Supreme Court
in A.K. Gopalan.

72

Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of india, (1998) 4 SCC 409, at 420.

73

Id, at 429.

